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of vegetation; when the round is stopped, the sesquioxide and the solution of sulphate in which all the ingredients are bathed are robbed of the oxygen and form pyrite.

The classic laboratory experiments show that organic animal matter acts with greater rapidity and sureness, and the resulting pseudomorphs of sphalerite, chalcopyrite, or pyrite, when a live clam is placed in a saturated solution of a sulphate of the above, are well known. We find them abundantly in nature, in the Trenton rocks as well as in the coal measures.

EDWARD H. WILLIAMS, JR.

THE CROCKER LAND EXPEDITION

TO THE EDITOR OF SCIENCE: The Crocker Land Expedition which was to have gone northward this summer under the leadership of George Borup and D. B. MacMillan, has been postponed to the summer of 1913, on account of the lamentable death of George Borup and the impracticability of finding a substitute for him in the short time remaining before the expedition was to start.

The Honorary Committee, consisting of President Henry Fairfield Osborn, Mr. Chandler Robbins, General Thomas H. Hubbard and Dr. Walter B. James, and the Committee in Charge, comprised of Dr. E. O. Hovey and Mr. H. L. Bridgman, have begun the reorganization of the expedition along such lines as circumstances may necessitate, without changing the main objects of the enterprise, as set forth in the prospectus issued in January 1912.

Colonel Borup and a number of the principal supporters of the expedition have united in the furtherance of the new plans; the expedition will be a memorial to George Borup, the young explorer who was so keenly interested in it and who was the mainspring of the original undertaking.

Mr. MacMillan's connection with the enterprise continues as heretofore, and he is utilizing the intervening time for the purpose of making additional preparation for the scientific work of the expedition.

A considerable part of the supplies and equipment had been prepared. The prepared

material has been put into safe storage for use next year, while the special apparatus is being assembled at the museum. Subscriptions already made are sufficient to insure the starting of the expedition a year hence.

EDMUND OTIS HOVEY,
HERBERT L. BRIDGMAN,
Committee in Charge

UNIVERSITY CONTROL

LETTERS FROM HARVARD UNIVERSITY

I AM on the whole very pleasantly impressed, as you know, with the general constitution that has been worked out at Harvard: a bi-cameral arrangement for the general governing boards; one large academic faculty and several professional faculties for the boards of instruction; comparatively independent divisions and departments, with a considerable range of initiative within their own fields; a president who is, while powerful, still subject to a great many decidedly distinct and potent sorts of checks from alumni and from various boards. This constitution does not seem to me perfect. The president at Harvard has probably still too large a range of discretion. The result is certainly not bad; but is also still subject to further growth. The bi-cameral system (the "overseers" elected by the alumni, able to advise but not to initiate legislation, able also to veto; the "corporation," self-perpetuating and capable of initiating, but always subject to the overseers' veto), seems to me to work well but unevenly, since the overseers have their seasons of too great or too little activity, while the president is probably a little too potent in influencing the corporation legislatively. Nevertheless, I regard the result of the interaction between the "overseers" and the "corporation" as so useful in many crises, and so convenient both in calling out and in holding in check the interests of the alumni, that I can not be convinced of the value of your proposals 1 and 2, if they were regarded as contemplating a constitution intended to take the place of ours. I should say, in place of your proposal (1), that a bi-cameral governing body like ours is preferable to the

arrangement that you prefer. Let the alumni, or in state universities, perhaps some larger constituency of interested persons, elect one governing board—not one of absolute authority, but a representative and influential board, with a veto power large enough to be a significant guard, and an advisory power large enough to keep the university in touch with its public. Let there be another board, of another origin, to act as legal owner of the property. Let this board have a real, but not too potent authority as a manager of affairs. Let these two boards cooperate with mutual criticism. Then you could afford to give your president more power and dignity than you do in number (2). I do not agree that the president should be as shorn of power as you make him. Let him be reasonably limited, but not helpless. “Security, permanence, honor” are all consistent with a reasonable presidential leadership. With the spirit of your proposals (3) and (4) I am, on the whole, in sympathy, although I could not go so far as you do. I am willing, as at Harvard, to submit the appointment of officers of instruction to the veto of general governing boards; and to have those boards, as well as the faculties and other teaching “units,” take part in all legislation that concerns general educational policies. A professor should have a solid tenure of office during good behavior, and should also have freedom of teaching. A department, or division, or other such small “unit” should have a large scope of discretion as to its own work. But one must keep in touch with one’s alumni and one’s public as to all questions of common educational policy; and this is why the legislation by general boards is needed, as well as the relative autonomy of departments and of individual teachers. You insist on the latter. To that insistence I agree; but I want the general boards to aid also in legislation. As to (5), I think that you go too far in expecting the departments or divisions to elect a senate capable of doing all their principal legislation for them. Once more—a frequent interaction with governing boards of the type of our Harvard “overseers”—boards that represent the

alumni, and that can veto rather than initiate, seem to me a useful aid and check. What one wants is to get all the forces expressed in the university life, without arbitrary mutual interference, but with constant and mutual criticism, and without anarchy, although with plentiful individual freedom. On the whole that is what we have at Harvard.

I recognize the danger of your “Scylla of presidential autocracy” and “Charybdis of faculty and trustee [collective] incompetence.” But I have seen so much efficiency, of the right kind, result from the lodging of great powers in the hands of a wise and able president that I am unwilling to agree, concerning this officer, that “his salary should not be larger, his position more dignified or his powers greater than those of the professor.” Of course the right man for president is hard to find, and of course the wrong man is occasionally chosen. I wish that every man accepting a university presidency might do so with assurance of the opportunity to retire at any time from the office on a respectable pension; this would be a happy way out, for the president and for the university, in many unfortunate cases; but I would not see the powers of a well chosen, well qualified president stinted. On the other hand, I have seen a great president content to lay his most cherished projects before a large faculty and labor year after year to bring this faculty to his own way of thinking, convinced that in this assembly he had, on the whole, the most intelligent and the most fairminded body of men in the world, for his purposes. The deliberative habits of this faculty under the president were most exasperating to those who are fond of swift decisions in educational questions, and by common consent, as matters of general interest pressed upon us, matters of detail and routine were delegated more and more to committees or to special administrative officers. Moreover, departments or divisions, as they grew in size, assumed new functions, somewhat as they should according to your plan. But through all these changes, a faculty remained a fairly coherent body, mem-

bers generally, old and young, feeling that, when certain questions of general policy were up, each man of them was expected to do his duty, though comparatively few, as a rule, took an active part in the debates. Furthermore, the frequent faculty meetings, though they did not by any means make every member know every other member, tended advantageously toward general acquaintance, and individuals who, from temperament or from departmental affiliations, must differ, could at least differ more intelligently than if they had not known each other by sight. The combination which I have described, a masterful but considerate president, strong enough and fair enough to invite frank counsel, with a faculty willing to give this counsel in a broad spirit of loyalty, has existed, I believe, not in one institution alone, but in many. With this combination formal checks and balances of authority are needless; without it they are of little avail. It seems to me the "necessary and sufficient" condition of genuine success for a university dealing with educational problems as they exist in this country. In using the term faculty I mean a body which controls the instruction leading to some degree or degrees, and I am not advocating general meetings of all the various faculties which may exist together under the university name. It is unlikely that any president could feel himself equally a master of the situation in all the various faculties, arts, law, medicine, etc., of a modern full-fledged university; but the advantage of having some one active man to preside at all meetings of these faculties, to watch, and report upon, and in a measure control, the relations of the several faculties to each other, seems great. A "chancellor" for show occasions, "to represent the university at public functions" or even "to obtain endowments," would, I think, be ineffective in comparison. As to the selection of professors, I fear that the plan of having all nominations come from departments might result in that condition of academic inbreeding which is noted in some places. At any rate, the faculty selection of professors appears to have had a tendency toward this condition in cer-

tain institutions. I am sorry to take issue with you on some of your most important propositions, for I agree with much that you maintain, and especially with your declaration that "security, permanence, honor, the slow growth of traditions, are essential to a true university." The proposition that great salaries are needed to induce able men to enter university positions, or that great salaries would bring into university professorships the best men, on the whole, for these places, I hold to be fallacious. Great salaries are not needed to call great lawyers from the gainful practise of the bar to the security and honor and sense of public service which they find on the bench. Every teacher, every "productive scholar," should feel himself to be a servant of the public, of a public wider, it may be, than any judge can serve. He should bear himself, and be honored, accordingly.

The plan which you outline is an interesting one which I should be glad to see tried as an experiment somewhere where I am not. The gravest danger I see in it is the proposition that professors be nominated by the departments. This would almost inevitably have the tendency to cause the promotion of men already in the departments, rather than the securing of the best man available, if he happened not to be there. The method of nomination by a faculty composed of only the full professors, as is the case in Germany, obviates this difficulty, since the full professors are no longer looking for advancement, and an appointment from outside will not put any one ahead of them as would be the case for all other members of the department. I am not at all sure that even this method of selection by a faculty of full professors is superior to the present methods commonly in vogue. Yale, I believe, has such a system, and I do not see that the appointments there have been unusually strong. The main reason why I feel doubt about your scheme is that the averages of our faculties the country over are still so low intellectually. Mediocrity is the almost unbroken rule. No doubt this will improve in time; it has improved greatly during

the last twenty years. At present, however, I feel that we have a better chance to secure men of intellectual alertness in the president's chair than as a composite photograph of a faculty or department. The catch-words of democracy and autocracy do not appeal to my judgment here. Of course I am with you in desiring to see the universities and colleges of the country so administered that the faculty members shall not feel that they are merely employees of the corporation (trustees), but that they have a large share in deciding policies and in the making of minor appointments. I do not believe it is necessary, to secure this end, to abolish practically as you propose the office of president. I doubt whether during the present generation at least a satisfactory substitute for the president can be devised.

The organization proposed under (1), (2), (3) and (5) depends for its success largely on the possibility of finding a man with the requisite qualifications for president, and securing his election. In throwing the responsibility for this choice directly on the faculty it would have a wholesome effect on this body. But whether any man with no more power given him than you propose for the president could become a leader is doubtful. Certainly Mr. Eliot could not have accomplished what he did for Harvard under this plan. But conditions have changed since then, and more could be done with the plan now. Still, are not our faculties too much bound up in the supposed interests of the undergraduate and with the cruder needs of this immature person, to be willing to take any chances when it is a question of higher scholarship? Are we ripe for this plan? I hope we are; but I do not know. The method of making appointments set forth in (4) is, I believe, a wrong one. At the present time there are not enough first-rate men in mathematics in the whole country to supply even the strongest universities, and I presume the situation is similar in other subjects. It is necessary, then, to discover the man who is scientifically strong early, and moreover it is neces-

sary to want to get the man who is scientifically strong. Now the majority of the men whose vote is necessary for a choice under your plan are not themselves scientifically first-rate men, nor do they know a first-rate man when they see him. They are going in any concrete case to impose conditions, each in itself corresponding to a desirable qualification, but all taken together such that the one (or possibly two) otherwise available first-rate men are ruled out. The result will be the choice of an eminently respectable member of society, who as he grows older will add so much more dead wood to the department and in his turn make the choice of a scientifically strong man difficult or impossible. If really strong appointments are to be made, the choice must rest ultimately with one or two men, as the president and the head of the department; and even two is sometimes too many. There have been cases at Harvard where Mr. Eliot has appointed professors from outside without the advice or consent of the departments, much to the good of the department in question. It is true that when both president and the head of a department are incompetent, good appointments are impossible. But only an act of God can save such a department.

I am inclined to think that the best form of government is beneficent tyranny, but of course such a person as Marcus Aurelius should always be chosen as tyrant. That there are some individuals more intelligent than the average, there can be no doubt. The point is to choose these as our leaders. Personally, the less I have to do with the details of running the university, the happier I am.

I have never reflected on the matter of college administration and my opinion is therefore of no value, and might readily be reversed by study, argument or reflection. I see no reason as yet for believing in your plan. A system like that of Harvard seems to me to work well.

Your plan of a representative rather than a town-meeting faculty seems to me excellent.

The rest of the plan seems to me no better than the one in use here, which has stood the test of use admirably.

I rather believe in finding the right man and then giving him a good deal of power. I confess the practical workings of democratic systems do not inspire me with confidence. In short, I believe in a centralized form of government for universities. This is more a matter of personal feeling than anything I can back with logic. I am quite ready to admit that such a system may not work well in a great many cases, though I think it is satisfactory here at Harvard. If the government of a university is to be of a democratic type then I have very little to criticize in your circular. I don't think a president and a chancellor would work very well. Why not have the trustees elect a president who would be commander-in-chief and then let there be a vice-president chosen by the senate to represent the academic side on the board of trustees? As to units, twenty seems to me too small a number. Why not have two or three faculties of fifty or more each? General discussion is a good thing. But these are minor points.

I can do no better than state my own experience in two universities, viz., Harvard and Toronto. First, I must say that I do not regard the university professor as such, as a progressive entity. He appears to me on the whole to be much less progressive than the average non-academic man. As a consequence of this feature of his psychology, it is often to the advantage of the institution, with which he happens to be connected and certainly to the advantage of his more progressive colleagues, if he has any, that he should feel the spur of presidential displeasure at times. When I was connected with the University of Toronto, there were many things which badly needed setting right, so much so that the university was investigated by three royal commissions within a decade. The remedy which was finally chosen was the appointment of an autocratic president of the American

type. So far as I am aware the academic machine has worked very well since this change. At Harvard the forces of conservatism, not to say the *vires inertiae*, are quite as strong as they are in any other university I have had experience of, and I happen to know that the academic lives of some of the members of the Harvard staff who may possibly be more progressive or energetic than their immediate colleagues, would scarcely be enduring, but for the fear of the omnipotent president. This is true not only of President Eliot's régime, but also of that of the present incumbent, President Lowell. It appears to me that, on the whole, autocratic powers on the part of a university president are a necessary evil. It does appear, however, that there should be some machinery which, in cases of extreme injustice, might exercise a veto on his acts. I do not think that a president having only a limited tenure would be valuable to the university, nor do I believe that it is very desirable to make his position less dignified than it is at present. A very great desideratum at the present time seems to be a professor's protective association, which among its functions might insure its members against unjust loss of position, and which might also act as the advocate of professorial rights in a general way. University professors at the present time in American universities are too much at the mercy of the administration.

I hardly feel qualified to express an opinion about general university organization that would be worth while. I will outline to you the organization that we have in the Harvard Medical School, because it seems to work satisfactorily under our conditions, and this may be of some help to you. (1) The Medical School has an independent budget made up of the income from funds given definitely to the Medical School, and of fees from students. The Medical School pays its proportionate share of the expenses of the general university, such as the president's salary, etc. (2) The Medical School has its own faculty, which is large, as is the custom with Harvard faculties. This faculty is presided over by the

university president, and bears the same relation to the corporation and to the board of overseers of the university as do other Harvard faculties. (3) All teachers appointed for more than one year are members of the medical faculty. These teachers are appointed by the corporation with the consent of the overseers on the recommendation of a committee composed of all full professors in the Medical School. (4) There is a dean of the faculty of medicine, a dean of the Medical School and a dean of the Dental School. The dean of the faculty of medicine is responsible for the preparation of the general business of the faculty. The dean of the schools is responsible for the individual school, its business and its budget. The deans are appointed by the corporation without vote on the part of the full professors. (5) The various departments in the Medical School are organized into six divisions, each division made up of closely allied subjects. Each division elects a chairman, and each member of the component departments who has been connected with the Medical School for more than one year is entitled to a vote. The six chairmen so elected, with the dean of the school, constitute a faculty council, and the faculty council has supervision of matters concerning the curriculum, the extension of the work of the Medical School, etc. To it are referred recommendations from all the divisions and departments for consideration and report to the faculty. In the same way matters brought up in the faculty touching these points are referred to the faculty council for consideration and report. (6) Assistants and instructors reappointed annually are nominated by the professors in the various departments, and their nomination referred to the division acting as a committee on these nominations. If approved by the division, these nominations are sent to the dean, and by him to the corporation for appointment. (7) There is an administrative board of the school appointed by the corporation, which with the dean act upon matters affecting student discipline, to a certain extent financial matters, that is, discussions of appropriations and awards of

scholarships, etc. This seems a rather cumbersome organization, and is probably in part the result of the accretions of time. However, under it pretty nearly every one connected with the Medical School has an opportunity in one place or another to freely express his views on matters concerning the policy of the Medical School, and in some way to record them by vote. At the same time those holding more responsible positions are given an opportunity to have a proportionately larger influence on Medical School matters.

So far as the general outline of your plan is concerned, I should express approval. It may interest you if I tell you something of what we have done here in the Medical School within the last two years as the result of an agitation initiated about seven years ago. Two years ago the present organization was adopted, and it works exceedingly well. The departments of the school—the department means all those which give a separate examination, or which have an assistant or full professor at its head—were organized in divisions of allied subjects. There were six such divisions, lettered A, B, C, D, E and F. Division A includes the departments of anatomy, comparative anatomy and the Warren Museum. Division B includes physiology, comparative physiology, biological chemistry, materia medica and therapeutics. Division C includes pathology, comparative pathology, bacteriology, preventive medicine and hygiene, neuropathology. Division D includes theory and practise, clinical medicine and surgery, psychiatry, pediatrics. Division E includes surgery, orthopedic surgery, obstetrics, gynecology. Division F, dermatology, syphilis, ophthalmology, otology, laryngology. Each division consists of all members of the constituent departments. Those entitled to a vote in the division are members of the faculty, instructors and assistants who have served three years or more. Each division elects its own chairman and a secretary, and matters of interest to any member of the division are brought up for discussion at meetings held for the purpose. The chairmen are

elected for terms of three years, and are not eligible for immediate reelection. The president of the university, the chairmen of the divisions and the dean of the school make up what is called the faculty council. This council considers all questions arising in regard to courses of study or extension of the medical school and the creation of new departments, and reports on the same to the faculty of medicine. Questions on such topics may originate in a division and be brought before the council for consideration, or they may originate in the council; but in such case, no matter directly concerning a division or a department shall be referred to the faculty for action until it has previously been referred to a division for discussion and recommendation to the council. Of course there are other details, but I will not make this letter too long by putting them before you. The general plan has now been working for more than two years, and seems to be meeting with entire approbation. Certainly the results are good in that they have brought together men and interests that before were drifting widely apart. It may interest you to know that this scheme is being discussed with a view to its adoption in at least two large medical schools. The essential point in which it differs from the organization of, say, the Johns Hopkins Medical School, is that it increases the dignity of the professor and does not compel a young man who has secured such rank to remain under the control and tutelage of an older professor or else change his university. The fundamental objection to the Carnegie report on medical education has always seemed to me to be the assumption that the Johns Hopkins organization is the best. In the case of that university it undoubtedly worked well, because they were fortunate in securing strong men in the beginning; but certainly the present indications are that they must either reorganize and give some of their juniors independence or else lose them.

It seems to me that the general plan outlined is excellent in so far as it gives a hand

in the control of a university to those who are most intimately interested in its welfare; namely, its alumni, its faculty and the section of the community at large which it serves. I think it is also excellent, in so far as it seeks to increase the dignity and respect in which a university chair should be held by all persons. The weakest part of the scheme, as it seems to me, lies in the direction for securing new professorial appointments. It goes without saying that each department of a university contains among its teachers expert judges of the intellectual standing of men outside the university, prominent in various lines of scholarship and achievement. In so far as the faculty members are judges of the standing of outside men, their judgments are of great value, when the question of appointing a new man to an assistant professorship or a full professorship comes uppermost. On the other hand, I think that a faculty may often err in its judgments as to the type of intellectual work that should be encouraged in a university. I think that in some cases experience has shown that faculties invested with the power of appointing new professors, subject to the approval of trustees, have erred grievously in policy, by appointing men too narrowly along certain intellectual lines. For example, I can readily imagine that at some particular university, some particular subject may be taught by the faculty members in its department, who may be staunch supporters of some particular doctrine or line of work. The men in that department are naturally and properly enthusiastic and earnest in their desire to see their favorite line of intellectual work extended. If they are empowered to appoint new faculty members, they are likely, with the best and worthiest of motives, to appoint new men whose views and work lie parallel to their own. The consequence of continuing such elective policy, might, in the course of years, unbalance a university seriously, developing its activities too extensively in some particular lines, to the neglect of other lines equally important. For the above reasons I consider that while the faculty of a university should have some hand in appoint-

ing new members, the president or some equivalent power should be able to prevent the university becoming too one-sided. It should lie in the hands of the president, or equivalent power, to introduce such new men into the faculty as may permit of the university work expanding harmoniously and uniformly. Of course, the appointing power in the hands of a president tends to give large influence to an individual. To counterbalance that tendency, along the lines of your plan, it seems to me that it should lie out of the power of the president to dismiss faculty members except for flagrant cause. Faculty resignations should only be exacted by faculty action. To sum up, I should like to see your scheme amended by giving appointing power, under certain restrictions, to college presidents, but giving dismissing power exclusively to faculties.

The plan you propose has many advantages. In the case of a department devoted to research it is very important that the officers concerned, who are familiar with the subject, should have almost complete control of the administration, especially as regards the appointment of the staff and the plans of work. It is a misfortune when such a department is controlled by a body of men who have no technical knowledge of the work undertaken, or, by personal inspection, familiarity with the investigations actually in progress. It is particularly unfortunate when such a body is more interested in another department of the university and is likely to take action for the benefit of the latter at the expense of the former. The case is like that of the stockholders of a small railway controlled by a larger railway system. Their interests are likely to be sacrificed for the benefit of some portion of the system in which the directors have greater interests. As regards the details of your plan, I think that you go too far in reducing the powers of the president. Every university should have one man of very high grade who would devote his entire time to the work. He must be a man of affairs and capable of keeping the work of the university

before the influential portion of the public. I do not believe in the English system of a non-resident chancellor who is simply a figure-head. If the various departments were represented on the governing board, and had the right of nomination as proposed in your (4), the powers of the president would be sufficiently reduced. With these modifications your plan seems to me a good one.

(1) I do not see why members of the corporation should pay annual dues. It seems to me likely that the revenue would be smaller under this system than under the present one in which many men elected to university offices voluntarily give much time and money to worthy objects which they foster. I also think it advisable to keep in all forms of government some degree of subordination and that the best interests of all the professors of an institution are best guarded by having the allotment of funds in the hands of men who are unhampered by personal interest in obtaining an allotment as must be the case where a professor serves as a member of the corporation or body making allotments. The tendency would, I fear, be to work to the advantage of certain professors and departments and against a fair deal for other professors and departments. (2) I think the election of a president by the faculty might be an improvement on the present system. The matter of the salary of the president should be adjusted to circumstances. It is to be presumed that the president has unusual expenses by reason of his office, which unless allowed for, might result in only wealthy men being able to take the position. It seems to me the president should have powers greater than the professor, but perhaps only those which pertain to the chairman of a meeting acting in accordance with parliamentary rules. I would grant him veto power in regard to financial measures. (3) Agreed to, except that a department or division may be able to conduct its affairs wisely when the number of members is less than the minimum of ten prescribed by the "psychological constant." (4) Agreed to. (5) Agreed to. My chief objection to a change from the present system of placing the

control of measures involving expenditure in the hands of non-faculty members of the university lies in the innate division of professors into two groups, those with dominant administrative powers and secondary intellectual accomplishment in their professed field of work, and those with dominant studious habits and without aggressive worldly mindedness such as characterizes the administrator busy with the affairs of his fellows. In the proposed plan it seems to me that the chances are that certain groups of men would more than now develop onesidedness in the policies of a faculty, and that academic politics would receive an additional impulse. But I may be mistaken in this suspicion. The right of the individual professor to vote for representatives should safeguard him in this matter and on the face of it the plan seems to give fair play.

Naturally I do not wholly agree with the proposed plan. I think it is fair to say, however, that I am wholly in sympathy with the spirit of the plan and should agree that our present autocratic government may profitably be modified in the directions which you mention. I suspect that many modifications of the plan would be suggested in connection with any attempt to put it in operation. As I understand your proposition, the chief problem is one of the rôle of the president, and in this I should heartily agree with you that scholarship and research, at least, are likely to be far safer and much more advantageously promoted under the type of administration which exists in European universities than under our own. A wise autocrat may do much to foster the life of a university, but ideal men for such positions are so rare that it seems little less than absurd for our American institutions to continue their present form of administration. I most heartily approve of division organization. With certain slight modifications we might have at Harvard a very efficient organization of this sort, but of course at present all such division units are subordinate in a great variety of ways to the president. One of the most urgent needs in

our institutions, it seems to me, is a good method of choosing professors. This, I think, is wisely provided for in your plan. On the whole, I should favor experiments in the directions which you have indicated and should confidently expect that our university government might be very markedly improved. I feel that we need to take account both of American conditions and of the forms of government which have been thoroughly tested, especially in England and in Germany.

I am in sympathy with much you state in this article and fully in accord with many of your views. The question is complex, especially as between state universities and "private" universities.

I believe it would be impossible to foretell what would be the outcome of such a scheme for university organization as you propose, if applied to our American universities. The present situation needs a remedy and your scheme has so many good points that I would favor a conservative trial of it. I am sure that the last sentence on flexibility and anarchy is what we should all strive for.

I agree with most of your suggestions. In my opinion it is practically impossible for the president of a university intelligently to preside over all the different faculties of the university.

The plan of university control outlined in your enclosure appeals to me as admirable in striving to develop a more equitable division of effective powers between faculty and president than obtains in most universities at present.

I am entirely in sympathy with your effort toward the administrative improvement of our universities. Professors ought not to be employees but members of the firm.

I sympathize heartily with the views in regard to university control which you propose, but do not feel competent to discuss the entire subject, especially paragraphs (1) and (2). I may say, however, that I have always felt that a small self-perpetuating corporation,

such as that at Harvard, without age limit for its "fellows," although all members of the university are considered incapacitated at sixty-six or thereabouts, is inherently wrong and altogether autocratic. The corporation should be selected by the alumni, by the general body of instructors, or better perhaps by both, and I doubt much if the appointment should be for life.

I am quite in accord with the scheme proposed and raise a question only concerning one point which is included in (4). While in thorough sympathy with the democratic mode of control, I doubt its efficiency. In such departments as I have been connected with, the lower positions are filled more or less temporarily by men who expect to pass on to other higher positions. They have not the responsibility for the department, as is the case with the professor, and as far as my experience has been, they lack interest in the matter of appointments and policy. Furthermore, they are not acquainted with conditions and men to the extent that the head of the department must be in order to make his department a success. In fact, I believe that the head of the department must be "czar" or "boss," so to speak, and those under him must be responsible to him in order to make such a unit a success. In fact, the executive work of a department in my opinion, must be attended to by its head or a person representing him. On the other hand, I believe that it is important that all matters pertaining to the department should be discussed freely by all concerned, and of course in regard to scientific matters there should be the utmost freedom. We have an organization with the unit similar to that outlined in your plan, and it strikes me that there is apathy and a general lack of interest among the younger men.

I heartily approve the general principles of your plan of university control. A plan which secures a separation of the financial and the educational administration is, in so far, a vast improvement over the prevailing plans which ordinarily assume that one gov-

erning body may be expert both in business affairs and in educational matters. I favor, too, the more democratic control secured by your plan. I fear, however, that the corporation provided for in (1) of your plan might easily be too large and too freely constituted to be efficient. I should consider it highly unsafe to let the corporation include any "members of the community" who might be pleased to "ally themselves with it" and "pay annual dues." There should be some fairly rigid qualifications for membership designed to exclude all who are not willing to give much of their time and energy to the upbuilding of the university. I see no important function in the office of a chancellor. Why should not the president best "represent the university in its relations to the community," for the university is essentially an educational institution—not a business institution? The further details of your plan, as set forth in (2)–(5), I favor without important exception. The plan of electing professors seems unnecessarily complicated perhaps. Here at Harvard the small division or department enjoys a high degree of autonomy, especially in matters of educational nature, much as your plan proposes. I trust that your agitation of this matter may serve to direct the evolution of our universities along more desirable lines.

In regard to your interesting scheme for university control, paragraph (1) I agree with (with the possible exception of the "members of the community who ally themselves with it"). Would not the alumni of the established university be enough representation? I also agree with paragraph (2). The office should be yearly, or for not more than two years, regarded as a position of dignity, and the election come from the faculties. He should be paid during this time more than a professor, because his work will be greater, more bothersome; he will have to attend functions and dinners and should be compensated for this, particularly for the dinners. In paragraph (3) the unit of organization should be the different faculties. I am not sure about the representation in this, but I think that the

representatives should be the heads of the various departments, the men who are really responsible for the character of the work in each department. There is a difficulty here with regard to the very large departments, such as history, literature or chemistry in a university. It might be difficult here to single out the one responsible man. The other plan would be by the election of representatives by the departments of the faculties. This would probably be necessary in the philosophical faculty. The maximum of representatives for each faculty should not be more than twenty. In paragraph (4) I agree fully with regard to the election of the dean and the nomination of professors. The board of advisers I also think is an available feature. One of the great difficulties which I see in university management is that of the removal or non-continuance of inefficient men holding minor positions. Of course, such minor positions, including assistant professors, should be for a term of years and at the end of this term the position should be regarded as vacant and be filled by the best man available. It is much easier to say this than to do it. Certainly in our medical schools and in the hospitals, if a man gets into a minor position he is pretty sure to go on to continual advancement irrespective of the character of his work unless this has been very bad indeed. Nominations by a committee will not obviate this trouble because the committee will not seriously consider this.

The American college president is certainly an anomaly in education; and the wonder is that the system involving him works on the whole so well. Certainly university faculties do not seem well qualified to manage universities; and state or national educational boards are to be dreaded—Heaven save us! Does not the existence of the present system show that faculties are unbusinesslike and are willing to have some one manage for them? The present method presents a strong contrast to that of the directors of a mill or manufacturing company—where the matters germane to the industry are discussed by a board of

directors with a president who is the executive officer. Imagine the feelings of the directors if the president should go to another body, on which the directors have no representative, and state the opinions of the directors as he understands them, or as he desires them to be understood. This is the condition in most of our universities. The faculties should shape the educational reforms of the universities—in a council consisting of not more than twenty men—heads of great departments. The president should carry the votes of such a council to the business and legal councils of the university to ascertain if there are practical objections to the plans of such an academic council. Why should one man assume to shape the educational future of a university?

It seems to me that the cooperation of all faculty members above and including the rank of instructor, should be desired, but how to get this is not clear to me. If the appreciative sympathy of all the faculty is not had, the control surely will go to the "old guard" and there it will remain, not permitting the careful and at the same time progressive policies essential to the health of the university, as a whole, or it will be taken over by some clique, which would be equally undesirable. Perhaps the end could be best attained by the adoption of a near-republican form of control, by which as much authority as feasible could be delegated, but in which all faculty members including instructors should have the right to vote and should be eligible for service on appropriate committees. The chief executive officer should be elected by this voting body, and for a definite term of years. The professors should also be elected by the same body, but for an indefinite period. I have no comment to offer on your suggestions except the single one, that they appear to me to be sound in every particular and worthy of serious consideration. Such universities as have barely escaped shipwreck through the use of wrong policies in control could well follow the plan laid down by you with great profit.